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ALL BATHWATER, NO BABY:
EXPRESSIVE THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Susan A. Bandes*
Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment. By Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker. Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2016. Pp. 322. $29.95.
Introduction
The death penalty in the United States is rooted in two anachronistic
traditions. The first is the Puritan ethic, which provides a respectable pedigree for a practice that today bears little connection to the concerns of the
Puritan era. The public hangings of that era, for example, deployed the execution as a ritual that would cleanse the soul of the condemned and encourage god-fearing behavior from the assembled crowds. But executions are
no longer public affairs. They no longer communicate, if they ever did, a
collective message of redemption and moral education. They occur in quiet,
closed chambers, more an antiseptic procedure than a shared public ritual.
Capital punishment as practiced today is best understood not in light of its
religious roots, but in light of its other U.S. precursors: slavery and the use
of lynching to enforce a racial caste system after slavery was abolished.
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker1 call the Court’s refusal to acknowledge
the role of race in capital punishment the “original sin” of U.S. death penalty jurisprudence (p. 3). In Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, they take the measure of this jurisprudence, considering
whether the Supreme Court is capable of reining in the arbitrariness and
unfairness that characterize the U.S. capital system. It will surprise no one
that the Steikers,2 the “most influential legal scholars in the death penalty

* Centennial Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, DePaul University College of
Law. This Review began taking shape when I was a visiting scholar at NYU Law School in the
spring of 2017, and I owe thanks to Rachel Barkow, Barry Friedman, and NYU’s Center on the
Administration of Criminal Law for being such gracious hosts. I am also grateful to Deborah
Denno, Carol Sanger, and Scott Sundby for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this
Review, and to David Garland for illuminating conversation.
1. Carol S. Steiker is the Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
Jordan M. Steiker is the Judge Robert M. Parker Endowed Chair in Law at University of Texas
School of Law.
2. Carol and Jordan Steiker are brother and sister and have frequently coauthored articles, as well as worked together on legislation and other death penalty initiatives. P. 5.
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community,”3 have produced a fair-minded, richly textured account of the
fraught relationship between capital punishment and the United States Supreme Court. The book will repay reading by both educated general readers
and legal scholars—including knowledgeable scholars in the field. The
Steikers are abolitionists and advocates, and they are straightforward about
their commitments, but readers who don’t share those commitments will
not feel short-changed.
One irony of a fair-minded doctrinal analysis is this: it calls into question the limits of legal doctrinal tools for shedding light on the forces that
shape and sustain capital punishment in the United States. As the authors
explicitly recognize, capital punishment doctrine often serves as little more
than window dressing, providing a false sense of coherence and legal legitimacy to prop up a regime that is both arbitrary and discriminatory.4 And
race is at the heart of this disconnect. It is the key to understanding the
origins of U.S. death penalty and the formidable challenges to its fair implementation.5 Yet the Court’s increasingly elaborate doctrinal framework
never confronts race directly.6
The Steikers argue for the importance of recognizing the uniqueness of
the “novel third course” our Supreme Court has charted “between the options of retention and abolition” (p. 40). The United States came tantalizingly close to abolishing the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia in 1972.7
But instead of finding the death penalty itself unconstitutional, the Court in
Furman focused on the procedural flaws that produced an “arbitrary and
capricious” death penalty.8 This approach left a crack in the door, and the
states rushed through with newly crafted statutes9 that the Court approved
just four years later in Gregg v. Georgia.10 As a result, in the odd hybrid state
that came to characterize U.S. death penalty jurisprudence, abolition was off
the agenda, but detailed regulation was put in place with the goals of ensuring fairness and consistency. The Steikers argue that this regulatory regime
has created the worst of both worlds: the appearance of careful or even overzealous scrutiny, but little actual constitutional protection for the rights of
defendants.11
3. Evan J. Mandery, A Wild Justice: The Death and Resurrection of Capital
Punishment in America 311 (2013).
4. See, e.g., pp. 211–12.
5. David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of
Abolition 190–91 (2010).
6. To the contrary, the Court famously declined to confront the issue because it so
pervaded the criminal justice system. See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
8. Furman, a 5–4 decision, consisted of nine separate opinions. The dominant theme of
the five opinions comprising the majority was the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. P. 61 (discussing post-Furman statutes that sought “to limit the discretion characteristic of death penalty schemes before Furman”).
10. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
11. See pp. 155–56.
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This book is clear-eyed and appropriately unsentimental about the
politics of the death penalty. But the authors do hold out hope that a principled capital jurisprudence is possible. They seek to distinguish the factors
that ought to animate the Court’s jurisprudence from those that are illegitimate. For example, they argue that the current legal regime is distorted by
electoral politics (and the effects of those politics on judges and prosecutors),12 by intense emotions (such as collective outrage at shocking crimes,
or selective empathy for some victims and their families),13 and by racial
prejudice.14
The Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the book’s main
arguments. Part II explores the implicit question underlying the Steikers’
critique: Is there a path toward a principled capital jurisprudence? Part III
focuses on so-called “expressive” theories of punishment, which emphasize
the symbolic, communicative importance of the death penalty.15 It argues
that expressive theories often cloud rather than clarify punishment discourse. It then returns to the topic of Part II, exploring the difficulty of
distinguishing “off-limits” or “extralegal” political, emotional, and prejudicial influences from appropriate legal influences on the death penalty debate.
This Review will question whether, once all these arguably illegitimate influences are stripped away, a coherent, principled doctrinal capital punishment
doctrine is possible. In other words, is there any baby, or is it all bathwater?16
I. A Devastating Account
The flash point for Courting Death is the four years that began with the
Supreme Court’s “bold abolition” of the death penalty in 1972 and ended
with its “chastened reauthorization” in 1976 (p. 3). In the 1972 case of
Furman v. Georgia, the Court was faced with a penalty that was “so wantonly
and freakishly imposed” that it was “cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”17 When Gregg v. Georgia
reauthorized the death penalty four years later, the Court began its “effort to
reform and rationalize the practice . . . through top-down, constitutional
regulation” (p. 3). The goal of Courting Death is to analyze the success or
failure of this “experiment”18 and what it means for the future (p. 5). The
12. See pp. 144–48.
13. See pp. 146, 161.
14. See generally chapter 3.
15. See Susan A. Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence of
the American Death Penalty, 42 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc’y 21, 32–33 (2008) (discussing expressive
theories of capital punishment).
16. The phrase is taken from Tom Stoppard’s play The Hard Problem. Tom Stoppard,
The Hard Problem 10 (2015).
17. P. 2 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
18. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
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Steikers, in accord with most scholars, pronounce the experiment a failure at
its intended goals of reining in arbitrariness and discrimination.19
As the Steikers show, the experiment has also had a number of unintended effects. These include a regime of hyperregulation that, in their view,
has produced little substantive protection for capital defendants, and yet has
convinced the populace that these defendants now receive too much protection (p. 155). Ironically, another unintended effect has been to build in yet
another source of arbitrariness. On some death rows, stays of several decades
have become commonplace.20 On most others, “confined almost exclusively
to the South and its borders,” execution is much swifter.21 The Furman
Court attempted to address arbitrary and capricious imposition of death
sentences. Today it is not only the sentencing stage that looks like a lottery; it
is also the execution stage.22
In their first chapter, the Steikers deftly disentangle the death penalty’s
religious roots from its roots in Southern colonies, where lynching, and then
capital punishment, were used to protect the slave economy (pp. 19–20).
They illustrate the legacy of both influences.23 It is fair to say that the legacy
of slavery holds much more powerful sway today than the religious legacy.
We no longer prosecute Puritan-influenced crimes against religious purity,
but the use of the criminal law to police racial boundaries persists. The authors emphasize the strong link between execution use today and the history
of lynch mob activity over a century ago (p. 17). As they underline, this
history extended well beyond slavery: “[O]ne of the functions of the death
penalty . . . was to create race: to segregate the myriad social positions of the
New World into hard and fast categories of white and black, free and enslaved.”24 They hold both legacies responsible, however, for two crucial aspects of our current day death penalty: the fact that it is largely a matter of
local and state control, and the fact that the officials who control death penalty practices (prosecutors, governors, legislators) come from the political
branches of government (p. 8).25
Time and again, the Court has endeavored to avoid confronting the
death penalty’s racially discriminatory history and application.26 The authors recount that the Warren Court, already embroiled in controversy over
the school desegregation decisions, believed procedural justice would be a
19. P. 4. See generally chapter 5.
20. See pp. 274–75.
21. See p. 118.
22. See p. 118.
23. See, e.g., p. 12.
24. P. 20 (quoting 1 Stephen John Hartnett, Executing Democracy: Capital Punishment and the Making of America, 1683–1807, at 20 (2010)).
25. Arguably, however, the problem unique to the United States is not so much the
separation of powers, but the nature of the roles themselves—both the prosecutorial role and
the judicial role. In the United States, prosecutors, as well as many state court judges, are
elected, whereas in many other countries they are appointed.
26. See generally chapter 3.
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more politically acceptable focus than racial justice.27 But by focusing on
procedural deficits, the Court created the false impression that the greatest
failings of the death penalty system amounted to discrete, isolated problems
like death-qualified juries,28 inadequacy of counsel, or the absence of statutory standards.29 In this account, the Court’s choice to focus on process was
pragmatic but also idealistic: a reflection of its reluctance to confront the
fact that constitutional intervention could not erase institutionalized racism
(p. 105). Subsequent courts continued the tradition of ignoring race
(pp. 111–15). Consequently, “the unjust influence of race in the capital punishment process continues unchecked.”30
The next several chapters take a hard look at the death penalty as it
operates today. Currently a few Southern states carry out the vast majority
of executions (p. 118). The authors make the important point that what
really separates the Southern states from the rest of the country is not so
much the number of death sentences they impose, but the alacrity with
which they carry them out.31 Outside of these former slave states, executions
are rare (pp. 118–20), and in some states—chiefly California32—capital punishment’s function is mainly symbolic. These “symbolic states” impose
death sentences but almost never execute anyone (p. 120).
As these stark geographical disparities illustrate, the federal constitutional limits on the death penalty, which theoretically bind every jurisdiction, are quite malleable. Some of the causes of this malleability are well
chronicled. The Court has shown no appetite for reining in prosecutorial
discretion (pp. 299–300). Vague jury standards like “heinous, atrocious, and
27. See p. 99.
28. The Court has held that prospective jurors who oppose the death penalty can be
excluded from capital juries for cause because of their unwillingness to consider all possible
sentences at the penalty phase. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 515 n.9 (1968). The
Court in Lockhart v. McCree accepted this proposition for the sake of argument only, 476 U.S.
162, 173 (1986), over a strenuous dissent by Justice Marshall pointing out that the evidence for
the effect was uncontradicted, see id. at 193 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Craig Haney,
Death by Design: Capital Punishment as a Social Psychological System 206 (2005)
(“The Supreme Court’s opinion in Lockhart notwithstanding, we now know that the . . . effects
[of death qualification] appear to facilitate the conviction of capital defendants and the imposition of death sentences.”).
29. See p. 109.
30. P. 110. This refusal to acknowledge the role of race in criminal justice is a much
broader problem, extending well beyond the death penalty arena. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado
& Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1543 (2001); see also
Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the
Struggle for Racial Equality (2004) (describing racial discrimination as the impetus for
many foundational criminal procedure cases, yet as an invisible presence in those cases).
31. Pp. 119–20. In the last week of April 2017, for example, the state of Arkansas executed four men, striving mightily to get the job done before the state’s supply of lethal injection drugs ran out. Mark Berman, Fourth Arkansas Execution in Eight Days Prompts Questions
About Inmate’s Movements, Wash. Post (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/27/arkansas-readies-to-carry-out-last-planned-executionbefore-drugs-expire/?utm_term=.06cc506ea679 [https://perma.cc/88NM-YDKX].
32. The other major state in this category is Pennsylvania. P. 118.
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cruel” do little to regularize sentencing (pp. 159, 177). Proportionality review has proved nearly toothless (pp. 163–64). These factors help explain
arbitrariness and discrimination, but they do not explain regional differences. The Steikers add an important layer of description: they show that at
the institutional level, there is enormous play in the joints: “It is only when
these unrelated institutional actors achieve some degree of integration or
political cohesion that one finds a steady stream of executions” (p. 149).
Today the promise of federal constitutional regulation devolves into separate constitutional regimes. The South33 is able to continue its enthusiastic
embrace of capital punishment, and its “resistance to norms dictated by
the . . . Court,” relatively unimpeded.34 California, which is ostensibly bound
by the same constitutional strictures, now has the country’s largest death
row, on which it is not uncommon for the condemned to spend decades.35
On California’s death row, execution is only the third most common cause
of death, after old age and suicide (p. 120).
In short, arbitrariness has not been eradicated. There is a robust consensus that “guided discretion”36 of the sort the Court demanded in Gregg and
subsequent cases is not achievable. It has proved impossible to individuate
among defendants while at the same time avoiding arbitrariness or discrimination. Few believe we have achieved the goal of executing the “worst of the
worst” (p. 164). The likelihood of receiving a death sentence is determined
not so much by culpability as by geography, race (of both defendant and
victim), and quality of representation.37 In the Steikers’ words, “[T]he
Court’s interventions strengthened the status of the death penalty . . . in the
eyes of actors within the capital system and of the public at large . . . [creating] the appearance of intensive regulation” and providing “unjustified
comfort” to those who administer the death penalty and to the public at
large (p. 156).
Does this thoroughly miserable report card show that the Court chose
the wrong path? The “what-if question”38 looms large for the Steikers. They
posit that the Court may have intervened too early; perhaps Furman, like
Roe v. Wade, was decided prematurely (pp. 74–76, 223–27). Alternatively, it
might have intervened too late (p. 48). There might have been a brief window in the early 1960s when judicial abolition would have been possible and
the resulting backlash less effective in resurrecting capital punishment
33. Including Texas and the Fifth Circuit. Pp. 132–37, 140–41.
34. See p. 149.
35. Pp. 274–75; see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the “excessively long periods” that the condemned spend on death row, and
citing statistics).
36. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens,
JJ.).
37. P. 268 (discussing Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2762–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
38. Mandery, supra note 3, at 432; see also Deborah W. Denno, Courting Abolition, 130
Harv. L. Rev. 1827, 1856 (2017) (reviewing Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment) (noting the difficulty of addressing the “what if” question in light of “the empirical unknown—the ‘compared to what’ question.”).
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(p. 75). The Steikers argue that the death penalty’s ability to mobilize the
public is contingent on its continued existence within a political community,
and they speculate that an earlier decision abolishing the death penalty
might have brought permanent abolition, bringing U.S. practice closer to
Europe’s.39
In addition to the question of timing, their account also raises the issue
of whether a different substantive approach might have worked better. What
if the Court had frankly acknowledged race? As the Steikers note, only Justices Douglas and Marshall were willing to even address this issue in Furman
(p. 89). The eminent NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF)40
urged the Gregg Court to address race, arguing in its amicus brief that racial
discrimination was “rooted in the very nature of capital punishment,”41 but
the Gregg opinions, which spanned 210 pages, made no mention of race at
all (p. 94). Whether or not there was a brief period in the 1960s when the
Court might have abolished capital punishment, it is virtually impossible to
imagine that it would have done so on racial grounds.
Any glimmer of hope that after Furman and Gregg the Court might still
confront the issue of race was extinguished by McCleskey v. Kemp.42 There
the Court accepted for the sake of argument the findings of the Baldus
study.43 The Baldus study was a major empirical investigation of the impact
of race on the administration of the death penalty in Georgia.44 It concluded
that racial bias skewed the process, finding that the race of the victim, and to
a lesser extent the race of the defendant, were unassailably powerful factors
in both the decision to bring capital charges and the decision to impose a
death sentence.45
The McCleskey Court, proceeding on the assumption that the Baldus
study was correct, essentially accepted LDF’s argument that “the evil of discrimination was not merely adventitious, but was rooted in the very nature
of capital punishment.”46 But it declared itself powerless to do anything
about this, stating that
McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. . . .
39. Pp. 73–75. However, this argument takes European support for abolition as a constant. Although European Union countries are currently constrained from reinstituting the
death penalty, see Garland, supra note 5, at 112–13, there is reason to wonder, based on
current trends, whether tensions about capital punishment in some European countries might
rise in the face of increasing heterogeneity and backlash against immigration.
40. The LDF was at the forefront of the litigation that led to Furman, Gregg, and related
cases. See p. 78.
41. P. 93 (quoting Brief for the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
at 1–2, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (No. 74-6257) [hereinafter LDF Brief]).
42. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
43. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7. See David C. Baldus et al., Equal Justice and the
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis (1990), for a description of the study.
44. Baldus et al., supra note 43, at 394–98.
45. Id. at 398–419.
46. P. 93 (quoting LDF Brief, supra note 41, at 1–2).
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Thus, if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly
tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar
claims as to other types of penalty.47

As the Steikers observe, this reluctance is of a piece with the Court’s larger
tendency to “retreat from . . . constitutional norms when it regards remedial
choices as unworkable or unattractive” (p. 236). It certainly reveals the
Court’s assessment (whether accurate or self-fulfilling) of the limits of its
own power to address racial discrimination. But in addition, the Court’s
self-professed helplessness rests on a crucial, questionable move: an assumption that it cannot take on racial discrimination in the death penalty context
unless it is also willing to try to fix the entire criminal justice system
(p. 174).
The Steikers occasionally suggest ways to reform capital punishment—
for example, exercising more robust proportionality review (pp. 163–64,
178), or narrowing the range of acceptable aggravating factors (pp. 161,
177), or raising the standards for effective representation (pp. 170–71,
178–79), or expanding the ability to assert “actual innocence” (pp. 173,
179), or attempting to insulate decisionmakers from electoral politics
(p. 182). But as they are acutely aware, regulating the death penalty can be a
treacherous trap: “[T]he impulse to abolish and reform the death penalty
produced a body of law that substantially stabilized and perpetuated American capital punishment as a societal practice, at least in the short term”
(p. 191). We are faced with a stark question. “Regulation can improve a
practice . . . [o]r it can reveal the unsettling truth that [the] practice is beyond constitutional repair” (p. 212). It is hard to read this book as anything
other than a compelling case for the latter conclusion.
That devastating bottom line is further explored in the next Part, which
asks the following question: Even if it were possible to cordon off undesirable influences such as inappropriate emotions, low politics, and invidious
discrimination, what would remain that we would be willing to claim as “a
fair and principled death penalty scheme”? (p. 169).
II. All Bathwater, No Baby?
In a discussion of recurring patterns in constitutional regulation, the
Steikers seek to identify some commonalities between the Court’s role in
shaping death penalty discourse and its role in shaping same-sex marriage
discourse. Yet the implicit differences between the judicial roles in these two
doctrinal debates are more salient than the commonalities, and these differences bring the central question of the book into sharp relief.
In both contexts, the Steikers argue, the Court’s rulings helped precipitate a shift in focus “from moral to utilitarian concerns” (pp. 250–53). They

47. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314–15.

April 2018]

All Bathwater, No Baby

913

also argue that the Court’s opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges48 redirected energy from refuting the harms of same-sex marriage to celebrating the fundamental value of marriage itself (p. 253). They suggest that the Court could
similarly influence the direction of the national death penalty debate
(pp. 253–54). The Steikers go no further with their parallel. Playing out the
comparison, however, reveals two crucial differences between the death penalty and same-sex marriage. In the same-sex marriage debate, opponents49
were brought up short when they had to defend their moral arguments in
court (pp. 251–53). Their moral outrage had taken them a long way politically (p. 250). But the landscape had changed by the time California’s Proposition 8 (Prop. 8), which sought to ban same-sex marriage statewide, was
challenged in federal court.50 By that point, same-sex marriage opponents
were faced with precedent that greatly weakened the force of their moral
argument—specifically, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.51
This precedent, as the Steikers describe, left opponents with no choice but to
defend their position with empirical data (p. 253). This encounter with the
federal court’s demand for evidence provided “moments of absurdist theater
that were a gift to the proponents of marriage equality, who easily demolished” the opponents’ arguments (p. 251). Similar scenarios played out in
the Seventh Circuit,52 and ultimately in the Supreme Court in Obergefell.53
As the Steikers describe it, the Court had “taken morality off the table,”54
and the opponents had little else to offer. They could no longer argue their
“real reasons,” and they had no reasons that could withstand judicial scrutiny (p. 253).
But in important respects, the trajectory of the capital punishment debate is quite different. Moral arguments hold more sway and have not been
vanquished by demands for proof. Moreover, although opponents’ moral
argument for prohibiting same-sex intimate conduct remained constant—
and ruled the day—for most of our history, moral arguments in the death
penalty debate have taken multiple shapes over the years. Indeed the authors
48. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
49. For the sake of clarity, I refer to opponents of same-sex marriage. In this context they
were proponents of Prop. 8, which would have banned same-sex marriage.
50. Pp. 250–52; see Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
U.S. 693 (2013).
51. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
52. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
53. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
54. P. 253. The Steikers assert that the import of Lawrence was that in order to prevail
“going forward, opponents of marriage equality would have to identify harms—other than
personal revulsion or moral outrage.” P. 251. Yet the effect of Lawrence on the Prop. 8 litigation
was arguably less clear than that. Lawrence, unlike the Prop. 8 case, concerned a criminal
statute, and could be read to place great weight on the threat of criminal consequences. See
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing the existence of a criminal statute).
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point out the irony that after years of morally grounded abolitionist arguments, it is now the death penalty proponents who are making moral arguments (pp. 249–50). Opponents can point to the overwhelming expense of
litigating death cases and keeping the condemned on death row.55 Proponents seek to rebut these utilitarian arguments with a moral imperative: imposing the death penalty when called for is “an issue simply of justice” that
ought to transcend practical concerns (p. 250).
In the same-sex marriage context, courts finally began rejecting the
moral argument in the new millennium, when popular attitudes had shifted
decisively. Once courts began insisting upon more concrete evidence, it was
revealed that the opponents could not support their legal argument. This
trajectory raises a revealing question: What would that triumphant moment
in court—when it turned out the opponents of same-sex marriage could not
back up their claims—look like in the death penalty context? What proof
would the proponents of execution have to adduce to support their moral
claims? This question is complicated for several reasons.
First, the Steikers emphasize that in the same-sex marriage debate, the
opponents’ arguments about the harms caused by same-sex marriage “were
lame because they weren’t the real reasons behind opposition . . . which were
entirely moral in character” (p. 253). Yet, as they acknowledge, “real reasons” have not played a major role in U.S. capital jurisprudence.56 The authors make a powerful case that racial prejudice is an unavoidable “real”
explanation for the current state of the U.S. death penalty. They also acknowledge that the Court has gone to enormous lengths to avoid acknowledging this and that it will probably continue to do so. Indeed, the
McCleskey decision is the dark underbelly of the same-sex marriage debate’s
Prop. 8 moment. Opponents of the death penalty adduced proof; the Court
turned away.
The disconnect in capital jurisprudence between “real” reasons and “legal” reasons is by no means confined to the race issue. For example, there
was a marked shift in discourse post-Furman from a reliance on the deterrence rationale to a reliance on the retributive rationale.57 It was becoming
increasingly apparent that there was no good evidence that the death penalty
deters crime, and this may have caused many to abandon the deterrence
rationale. But strikingly, the level of public support for the death penalty
remained constant even as the rationale for that support changed.58 People
changed rationales, but not their minds.59 Social scientists have repeatedly
55. Pp. 249–50 (discussing the enormous expense of both capital litigation and housing
inmates on death row for extended periods).
56. See p. 253; infra text accompanying notes 75–81.
57. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans’ Views
on the Death Penalty, J. Soc. Issues, Summer 1994, at 19, 26–29, 33.
58. Id. at 26–29.
59. Id. at 34. This outcome contradicted Justice Marshall’s hypothesis that more information about the workings of the death penalty would lead to more abolitionist sentiment.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361–62 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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concluded that “most people’s attitudes toward capital punishment are basically emotional. The ‘reasons’ are determined by the attitude, not the
reverse.”60
Moreover, the retribution rationale itself began to shift in the early
1980s, with a powerful assist from the Court. In Payne v. Tennessee,61 the
Court upheld the use of victim impact statements in capital trials. The
Court’s rationale was that these statements are informational: they help inform capital juries of the victim’s individual qualities and the impact of the
crime on the victim’s family.62 This new focus on the characteristics of the
individual victim had a strong influence on retributive discourse (and the
operation of death penalty trials more generally).63 One indirect result of the
Court’s ruling was the introduction of the language of healing and therapy
into the criminal courtroom. The retributive rationale, which had suffered
from its association with revenge, was now softened and recast as a way to
help victims’ family members heal.64
The path of capital jurisprudence is paved with reasons, but these reasons are often deployed ad hoc, inconsistently, or after the fact. The shifts
and dodges described above65 point to an even deeper problem. In capital
jurisprudence, the distinction between off-limits arguments and appropriate
legal arguments is extraordinarily hard to draw. The always-difficult delineation of categories like “morality,” “politics,” and “emotion”—and the effort
to distinguish those categories from the category of “law”—seem especially
intractable in the death penalty context. In capital punishment discourse,
moral and emotional concerns are prominent both at the justification level66
and at the individual decisionmaking level. Can we say that political considerations “distort” prosecutorial decisionmaking? Or that jurors’ empathy for
the victim, or anger toward the defendant, “distort” their decisionmaking?
Or that a defendant’s perceived remorse or arrogance “distorts” the jurors’
ability to evaluate his moral culpability? Are these influences bugs in the
system or its essential features? Traditional capital punishment discourse assumes that “rigorous, non-emotional reasons for or against the death penalty exist, but that the conversation keeps getting hijacked by unruly
passion.”67 Instead, the entire debate is imbued with moral and emotional
60. Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 57, at 26.
61. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
62. Payne, 501 U.S. at 819; see also id. at 832 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that
victim impact evidence helps convey the full extent of the harm caused by the defendant).
63. See infra Part III.
64. See Susan A. Bandes, Repellent Crimes and Rational Deliberation: Emotion and the
Death Penalty, 33 Vt. L. Rev. 489, 501 (2009); Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the
Sociology of Emotion, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 2009, at 1, 11–12 [hereinafter Bandes,
Victims].
65. See infra text accompanying notes 85–92.
66. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.) (holding that “[i]n part, capital punishment is an expression of society’s moral
outrage at particularly offensive conduct”).
67. Bandes, supra note 15, at 23.
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content.68 The next Part argues that the debate would gain some clarity
through a closer examination of the role of “expressive” punishment theories, which emphasize the symbolic, communicative role of capital
punishment.
III. Expressive Theory and the Death Penalty
“Expressive punishment” has become a grab bag of poorly differentiated
concepts that too often obfuscate rather than illuminate the death penalty
debate. The category can encompass a wide range of symbolic, communicative messages the death penalty might send, such as condemnation of the act
or the defendant, communication of the community’s grief and anger, or
recognition of the moral worth of the victim and the gravity of the loss.69
The phrase is often claimed to promote descriptive accuracy,70 but it is so
elastic that it can have quite the opposite effect. Expressive arguments also
often blur the lines between descriptive and normative claims, relying on the
claimed expressive power of punishment as a justification. Ultimately, the
question is whether the notion of expressive punishment, as malleable and
imprecise as it is, diverts attention from the question of whether the death
penalty today serves any legitimate penological purpose.
Expressive theories can serve an important descriptive role. They supplement and illuminate traditional legal explanations for many legal dynamics, including the basic question of how law communicates, shapes, and
seeks compliance with its basic norms.71 As Rick Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson observe in a seminal article, much of law is pervasively expressive.72 This
is a descriptive observation, not a normative one. As they caution, “Expressivism is not an independent, substantive moral or political philosophy . . . .
The contents of expressive legal constraints must come from the values that
inform the constitutional order . . . . Expressivism explains how our practices realize those substantive values in expressing them.”73 All punishment
has expressive elements. Deterrence theory is premised on the notion that
punishment communicates a message to the public: this is what will happen
if you do this. In the capital context, the question arises whether the message
is communicated by the imposition of sentence at a public trial or by the
actual execution (a question that has obvious ramifications for regimes
where executions are rare or where capital punishment is only symbolic).
But in all events, deterrence depends on public expression of the consequences of lawbreaking.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 32–33.
70. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021,
2027 (1996).
71. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Powers of Law: Theories
and Limits (2015).
72. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000).
73. Id. at 1570.
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Retribution is also expressive in nature. Retributivism is a public means
of pronouncing what is fair and just from the community’s point of view.
Sentences are pronounced in public and perform a signaling function about
the state’s recognition of the seriousness of the crime, the harm the crime
has caused, and the state’s duty to respond to it.74 What more is conveyed by
adding the “expressive punishment” category to these existing explanations?
As one scholar summarizes,
[Expressive theories] acknowledge the moral need to rectify past wrongs
while simultaneously seeking to generate positive benefits in the future.
More importantly, [they] have more explanatory power than mere justifications do, because expressive theories describe a social process and clarify
the relationships among the culprit, the victim, society at large, and those
who impose the punishments.75

But arguably retribution already acknowledges the need to rectify past
wrongs while deterrence signals the desire to achieve positive benefits in the
future. And viewing the expressive dimension as a separate category does
not help clarify the relationships among the actors. In fact, it does quite the
opposite: it allows us to avoid hard questions about those relationships. For
example, to say punishment is expressive clarifies nothing about whether the
state’s pronouncement of punishment on behalf of the community is a sufficient expression of condemnation, or whether individual victims or their
family members should also be permitted to express their pain and loss. The
term “expressive” is too vague to explain the roles of various actors in the
process and can provide unintended cover for a failure to examine rigorously what those roles ought to be.
Even if “expressive” is a term that helps explain what punishment does,
that is quite different from an argument for what it ought to do. There is
ample support for the view that public attitudes toward punishment are
largely driven by symbolic rather than instrumental concerns.76 But that is
not a normative argument. Assuming we accept some version of Durkheim’s
view that punishment serves as “an occasion for the collective expression of
shared moral passions,”77 it is a separate question when and how that passion ought to be facilitated by the government. To take the most obvious
example, lynchings in the South, as David Garland has described, were
“open, public, communicative events,” covered by the media, and implicitly

74. Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1445–46 (2004).
75. John Steele, A Seal Pressed in the Hot Wax of Vengeance: A Girardian Understanding of
Expressive Punishment, 16 J.L. & Religion 35, 36 (2001) (footnote omitted).
76. See, e.g., Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 57, at 31; infra text accompanying notes
86–90.
77. David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory
33 (1990) (discussing Emile Durkheim’s theories of punishment).
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or even explicitly condoned by government officials.78 The crowds participated in a kind of “collective effervescence;” an “unabashed pleasure in punishment and its associated festivities.”79 In short, the category “expressive”
covers quite a bit of territory, some of which is clearly out of bounds.
Just as the concept of “expressive punishment” is sometimes used to
smuggle positive normative evaluations into descriptive arguments, it may
also be used to signal opprobrium, often in concert with terms like “political” and “emotional” that also convey a negative assessment. For example, in
their astute analysis of why certain states have large death rows but no executions, the Steikers observe that in some states “the political benefits of
capital punishment are concentrated at the local level,” where “[e]specially
heinous murders tend to generate intense local outrage” (p. 146). This political calculus “puts pressure on local law enforcement actors to make arrests
and to bring capital charges” (p. 146). They then observe that the “charge,
subsequent conviction, and sentence generate most of the expressive value of
capital punishment, and thus most of the political points” to be scored
(p. 146), rendering the execution itself unnecessary. It is not evident what
work the term “expressive value” does in this analysis, beyond providing a
jurisprudential label for the political use of the criminal justice system to
reflect raw, unmediated emotion.
At the very least, all these terms appear to connote undesirable extralegal influences on capital decisionmaking.80 The three subsections that follow
examine the categories of “politics,” “emotion,” and “prejudice” and consider the question: To the extent these are extralegal influences, would it be
possible to strip them away and arrive at the principled core of death penalty
jurisprudence? Or are they an inextricable part of the doctrinal framework?
A. Politics
As the Steikers well describe, the death penalty in the United States is
intensely politicized, both institutionally (many of the most important actors in the administration of capital punishment are elected) and symbolically (p. 185). They describe the symbolic role this way: “[The death
penalty] looms much larger than it plausibly should in public discourse because it is a focal point for fears of violent crime and powerful political
shorthand for law-and-order policies generally” (p. 185). The institutional
and symbolic aspects of politicization, they argue, ensure that the death penalty process is subject to “intense pressures, which . . . contribute to its arbitrary, discriminatory, and inaccurate administration” (p. 185).
The authors quite reasonably assert that political influences should not
override analysis of the merits of particular cases. For example, there is no

78. Garland, supra note 5, at 30.
79. Id.
80. See Denno, supra note 38, at 1850–51 (emphasizing the importance of examining
extralegal influences).
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defensible argument for the fact that elected judges are, according to a number of studies, more likely to uphold death sentences around election time.81
But in a broader sense, capital punishment cannot escape politics.
Charging, trying, and sentencing in capital cases are always politically
charged acts (p. 146). The standard argument for local control of criminal
justice is that different localities have different priorities, conditions, and
resources and that these deserve deference, within constitutional limits. But
these local priorities can at times be hard to distinguish from localized fears
and moral outrage.82 At some point, the deference to local priorities must
give way to the prohibition on arbitrariness and discrimination. It may be
that once the notion of “the expressive value of capital punishment” (p. 146)
is stripped away, the particular political influences that animate the U.S.
death penalty will show themselves to be untamable and impossible to reconcile with the rule of law.
As the Steikers point out, when government officials gain distance from
local politics or are otherwise insulated, they may be able to ameliorate local
passions and pressures.83 In fact, political leaders can take the ability to exercise certain political passions off the table entirely, as occurred in Europe,84
where “anti–death penalty provisions have increasingly been embodied in
human rights conventions, transnational treaties and international law.”85
Although these changing international norms have intensified political pressure on other nations,86 the United States has thus far resisted the human
rights framework.87 But as David Garland shows, “[T]oday’s death penalty is
81. P. 186. A Brennan Center study found that appointed judges in capital cases were
most likely to reverse death sentences, judges facing retention elections were less likely, and
judges facing competitive elections were least likely. Kate Berry, Brennan Ctr. for Justice,
How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases 2 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/How_Judicial_Elections_Impact_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XDW6-38X7]. The study also found that “trial judges in Alabama override jury verdicts sentencing criminal defendants to life and instead impose death sentences more often in
election years.” Id. The study relies on, inter alia, Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Election and Judicial Politics in the American States, 23 Am. Pol. Q. 485 (1995), and Paul
Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Practice of Electing
Judges, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 360 (2008).
82. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the
Death Penalty, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 585, 593–94 (2004); see also Jed S. Rakoff, Will the Death
Penalty Ever Die?, N.Y. Rev. Books, June 8, 2017, at 46, 46 (reviewing Courting Death: The
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment) (suggesting that Courting Death should have paid
more “attention to the moral outrage that provides much of the emotional support for the
death penalty”).
83. See pp. 146–47 (discussing the ability of officials who are removed from immediate
local pressures to “remain more impervious” to politics).
84. Franklin E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment
23 (2003) (discussing the role of elites in abolishing capital punishment in Europe).
85. Garland, supra note 5, at 112–13.
86. Id. at 113.
87. See generally James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the
Widening Divide Between America and Europe (2003).
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deeply embedded in American political culture.”88 Its political and cultural
meanings are always evolving, but it is inescapably political.
B. Emotion
A major emotive shift in death penalty discourse has occurred in the
past several decades. By the end of the twentieth century, the deterrence
rationale for the death penalty was falling out of favor.89 The retributive
rationale had long had a public relations problem—it sounded too bloodthirsty; too much like the revenge that state-sanctioned punishment was
meant to replace. At the same time, the victims’ rights movement, which
sought better treatment for crime victims and their family members, was
becoming increasingly successful.90 Its most prominent early victory was the
Supreme Court decision upholding the admissibility of victim impact statements against constitutional challenge. Payne v. Tennessee91 upheld the statements on the ground that testimony about the characteristics of individual
victims and the impact of their death provided important information to
the sentencing jury.
The Supreme Court has not weighed in on victim impact statements
(VIS) since this 1991 decision. In the ensuing quarter century, the expressive
message conveyed by VIS has evolved in ways the Court did not (at least
explicitly) anticipate. Victims’ groups, prosecutors, lower courts, legislators,
and others have come to treat the ability to deliver VIS as a therapeutic tool
to help murder victims’ family members heal.92 This development has
changed the meaning of the jury’s verdict in capital cases. Juries are told that
they can help grieving family members by returning a death sentence. A
decision that once might have seemed too close to vengeance was reframed
as an act of compassion. The retributive rationale was softened and made
more palatable.93
This reframing of the expressive message has had other effects as well.
Just as it tells jurors that they can help victims’ family members heal by
returning a death sentence, it implicitly (and at times explicitly) promises
the family members themselves that a death sentence will bring closure.94
But whereas the message to jurors tends to dovetail neatly with the prosecution’s agenda, the message to victims’ family members creates expectations
of healing and autonomy that might be at odds with the prosecution’s
88. Garland, supra note 5, at 253.
89. Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 57, at 26–27.
90. See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88
Cornell L. Rev. 282, 285–87 (2003).
91. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
92. As well as the victim of crimes other than murder in noncapital cases. See, e.g.,
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Victim Impact Statement Booklet (2013) http://
domesticviolencehomicidehelp.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/victim-impact-statement
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VDG-EQTN].
93. P. 248; see also Bandes, Victims, supra note 64, at 19–20.
94. Bandes, Victims, supra note 64, at 11–12.
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agenda.95 Indeed it has long been a question whether the prosecution would
continue to support this new, more victim-centered rationale for capital
punishment when it threatened to limit prosecutors’ nearly untrammeled
discretion in capital cases.96
The conflict over the content of the expressive message was a powerful
subtext of the Boston Marathon bombing trial. The Richard family was a
focal point of the prosecution’s capital case against Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.97
The prosecution urged the jury to express its moral outrage at Tsarnaev and
to help bring justice on behalf of the Richard family and the other victims by
returning a death sentence.98 The Richards did not support the prosecution’s
request for a death sentence, and they chose not to offer victim impact testimony. Instead they wrote a letter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office conveying
their opposition to the government’s decision to seek death. They had come
to their own conclusion about what the death penalty expressed, and about
what would help them heal:
For us, the story of Marathon Monday 2013 should not be defined by the
actions or beliefs of the defendant, but by the resiliency of the human spirit
and the rallying cries of this great city . . . . As long as the defendant is in
the spotlight, we have no choice but to live a story told on his terms, not
ours. The minute the defendant fades from our newspapers and TV screens
is the minute we begin the process of rebuilding our lives and our family.99

95. And that the criminal justice system may be ill-equipped to meet. See Margaret
Vandiver, The Death Penalty and the Families of Victims: An Overview of Research Issues, in
Wounds that Do Not Bind: Victim-Based Perspectives on the Death Penalty 235,
238–40 (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006).
96. See, e.g., Charles F. Baird & Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the Victim: How
Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence Victims Who Oppose Capital
Punishment, 15 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 447 (2004).
97. Katharine Q. Seelye, Parents of Youngest Boston Marathon Victim Oppose Death Penalty for Tsarnaev, N.Y. Times (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/us/martin-richard-boston-marathon-bombing.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Denise
and Bill Richard lost their eight-year-old son Martin in the bombing. Id. Bill and Denise
Richard and their daughter Jane all suffered grievous permanent injuries. Id.
98. See Hilary Sargent, Tsarnaev’s Fate Goes to Jury, Boston.com (Mar. 4, 2015), https://
www.boston.com/news/local-news/2015/03/04/tsarnaevs-fate-goes-to-jury [https://perma.cc/
9GA9-VJPS?type=image].
99. Bill Richards & Denise Richards, To End the Anguish, Drop the Death Penalty, Bos.
Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/04/16/end-anguish-drop-death-penalty/oc
QLejp8H2vesDavItHIEN/story.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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The jury saw the letter only after it had sentenced Tsarnaev to death.100 One
juror said, “If I had known that, I probably—I probably would change my
vote.”101
In short, expressive messages are contested and sometimes contradictory, they are deployed strategically, and they evolve. The question of whose
emotions count is also contested—especially now that the introduction of
victims’ voices has disrupted the traditional adversary model. Emotions exist
in a complex feedback loop with institutions like the justice system. The
Supreme Court and other institutional actors do not merely reflect back the
emotions of those affected; they influence the emotional content of our responses to capital punishment. The question is: In service of what legitimate
ends?
C.

Prejudice

Punishment conveys a message of social cohesion. As Joseph Kennedy
observes, one way to promote cohesion is to reaffirm, through the criminal
justice system, our shared repugnance toward “[m]onstrous crimes and
monstrous criminals.”102 He also notes that “punishment that is truly morally expressive must make individualized and contextual judgments about
the moral worth of each offender—his degree of culpability for the crime he
committed and his potential for reintegration into the community.”103 When
offenders are regarded as monstrous, the solution is to cast them from the
human community. This reaffirms that the threats they pose are “external to
the group.”104
The crimes that generate outrage, garner media attention, and therefore
exert the most pressure on elected officials generally involve white victims.105
As the Steikers explain, “The racial disparities in capital charging decisions
favoring cases with white victims mirror the disparities in political influence
in the vast majority of communities” (p. 186). If the death penalty is an
opportunity to send a message about the value prosecutors and jurors place
on the lives of victims, the Baldus study provides evidence that these decisionmakers “value” white victims over black victims.106 The increasing focus
100. Kevin Truong, Boston Bombing Trial: Should Juror Have Known About Victim’s Family’s Wishes?, Christian Sci. Monitor (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
USA-Update/2015/0825/Boston-bombing-trial-Should-juror-have-known-about-victim-sfamily-s-wishes [https://perma.cc/49QF-5SUD] (“[T]he defense attempted to submit the Richard family’s view as part of the case, but the evidence was excluded by the judge . . . .”)
101. Patrick Radden Keefe, The Worst of the Worst, New Yorker (Sept. 12, 2015), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/09/14/the-worst-of-the-worst [https://perma.cc/4V3554DM].
102. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 Hastings L.J. 829, 830 (2000).
103. Id. at 833.
104. Id.
105. See p. 186; Bandes, supra note 82, at 585, 587.
106. Baldus et al., supra note 43, at 315 tbl.50; see also David C. Baldus & George
Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the
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on individual victim characteristics promoted by the Court in Payne has the
potential to exacerbate this racial divide.107
The goal of guided discretion statutes was to individuate among defendants while cabining improper influences like race. But there is pervasive evidence that this has not occurred.108 Craig Haney has written about the
“empathic divide” that separates white jurors in capital cases from black
capital defendants.109 Jurors, relying on vague, emotion-laden standards like
“heinous, atrocious, and cruel” (p. 177), make judgments about whether a
defendant has been shaped by his horrific background or is just evil.110 They
judge whether a defendant is remorseful or arrogant;111 chastened or a continuing danger to society.112 All these judgments are affected by race.
There is no good reason to think that the Supreme Court will properly
address the race discrimination that infects the death penalty. It has instead
consigned itself to perpetuating a regime that, based on all the available
evidence, cannot comport with the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.
Contrary to the McCleskey Court’s assumption, the fact that many of the
problems plaguing the capital punishment regime also affect the criminal
justice system more generally should not let the death penalty off the
hook.113 As the Steikers convincingly show, one deeply unfortunate effect of
the expressive power of the death penalty is that it has sucked so much air
out of other prison-reform efforts (pp. 290–91). Many of the problems infecting the capital punishment regime also plague the criminal justice system
as a whole. But it does not follow that we cannot address the death penalty
until we are ready to fix the entire system. Every society needs “some level of
imprisonment to deter crime and incapacitate dangerous offenders”
Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1411, 1423–26, 1424 tbl.3 (2004); Race of
Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976 [https://perma.cc/P2TR-5ZEC].
107. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof, and Prejudice: The
Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 1003,
1037–44 (2014); see also Regina Austin, Documentation, Documentary, and the Law: What
Should Be Made of Victim Impact Videos?, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 979, 987–88 (2012).
108. See generally Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1147 (1991).
109. Haney, supra note 28, at 203.
110. See Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism,
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1557, 1580–81 (2004) (explaining that jurors, in deciding whether to attribute a crime to internal choices or external
circumstances, tend to assess those different from them more harshly and assume their choices
are willed).
111. William J. Bowers et al., Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of
Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant Is Black and the Victim Is White, 53
DePaul L. Rev. 1497, 1502 (2004) (discussing findings that white jurors are less likely than
black jurors to see black defendants as remorseful).
112. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 Psychol. Sci. 383 (2006).
113. See p. 315 (discussing a slippery slope problem).
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(p. 316). But “[t]he constitutional attack against the death penalty is premised on the assertion that the death penalty is unnecessary and our society
would be best served by abolishing it altogether” (p. 316). Furthermore, as
Scott Sundby observes, “A slippery slope argument only works if the threat
that the system is going into an uncontrollable free fall is real and the consequences at the end of the slope clearly are to be avoided.”114 If the consequence of acknowledging discrimination in the death penalty context is the
need to address invidious discrimination in the criminal justice system more
broadly, this is a goal that ought to be embraced.
Conclusion
The “powerful drama and symbolism” of the death penalty have ensured that it occupies an “outsized role in public discourse about criminal
justice” (p. 317). Yet what does the drama signify? In the Steikers’ estimation, it is “political shorthand” with the “capacity to appeal to . . . many
different audiences in a visceral, emotional way” (p. 318). One might say the
death penalty is expressive all the way down. Moreover, its expressive message is not always the message the jurisprudence reflects. As Justice Marshall
said in another context, the underlying message is “less likely to be inarticulable than unspeakable.”115 In short, there is no path to a principled capital
jurisprudence on the horizon. As the Steikers rightly conclude, “The inevitability of discretion means that the capital decision cannot be tamed through
legal language” (p. 177).
The death penalty regime is a world away from the triumphant scene
that played out in the California courtroom in which the Prop. 8 proponents
were forced to adduce evidence to support their moral and emotional claims
against same-sex marriage. The Court’s interventions have long buoyed the
vain hope that there is a principled core, a set of “real reasons” that float free
from the “extralegal” emotion, politics, and prejudice that infect the death
penalty. The Prop. 8 moment illustrated the power and value of principled
jurisprudence—a demand for reasons that transcend politics, prejudice, and
raw emotion. It’s long past time to apply the same principled approach to
capital punishment.

114. Scott E. Sundby, The Loss of Constitutional Faith: McCleskey v. Kemp and the Dark
Side of Procedure, 10 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 5, 29–30 (2012).
115. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).

